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Abstract. In this paper we use firm level data from a listed multinational to investigate 
how several designs for the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) formula 
could affect the allocation of the consolidated tax base. The design is relevant in the light 
of member states’ concern for protecting their tax revenues, as well as for the multina-
tional companies’ tax minimizing possibilities. Moreover, it plays an important role in 
achieving an efficient and simple tax system. Simulating different apportionment formu-
las, the results show that including more factors and using more equal weights distributes 
the common tax base more equally, which could reduce the incentive to shift factors from 
high to low tax countries. The results also indicate that simplifying the factor definitions, 
leads to rather minor changes in the allocation. Using unpublished data, this study allows 
to investigate the consequences of different formulas in detail, which contributes to the 
current discussion on corporate tax harmonization in the EU. 
Keywords: CCCTB, corporate tax, European Union, apportionment formula.
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1. Introduction
In 2004, the European Union (EU) welcomed ten countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, which brought the total number 
of member states (MS) to twenty-seven. Notwithstanding this big achievement, the 
enlargement of the EU makes some policy problems even more pressing. One such 
problem relates to the several tax obstacles that are currently harming the international 
competitiveness of multinationals. Multinationals, for example, face high compliance 
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costs because of the different tax systems across the twenty-seven MS. Other tax ob-
stacles concern the limitation on cross-border loss relief and the problems with transfer 
pricing for intra group transactions (EC 2001a).
To remove the underlying causes of all tax obstacles, the EU wants to introduce a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). This new tax system should 
contribute to the Europe 2020 growth strategy that was established by the European 
Commission in March 2010 (EC 2010). In particular, it has the intention to increase 
the efficiency, effectiveness, simplicity and transparency within the European company 
tax system (EC 2001a; EC 2001b; EC 2006a). The tax liability of a company belong-
ing to a CCCTB group would be determined by applying four distinct steps. Firstly, 
each group member has to calculate its taxable profit according to the same set of rules. 
Secondly, the individual tax bases are summed up to the consolidated tax base. Thirdly, 
the consolidated tax base is allocated to the different group members by means of an 
apportionment formula (AF). Finally, each MS has the right to apply its own tax rate to 
the specific share of the overall tax base (Schön et al. 2008). 
In this paper we use financial data from a listed multinational in order to illustrate 
how several designs of the AF could affect the allocation of the consolidated tax base 
among different group entities. The design of the formula plays an important role in 
achieving an efficient and simple tax system (Spengel, Wendt 2007). Previous studies 
investigated the macro-economic effects of introducing an AF in Europe. Devereux 
and Loretz (2008) showed that the overall tax revenue would be likely to decline by 
2.5% if companies could choose whether or not to participate to CCCTB. Runkel and 
Schjelderup (2011) found that central authorities would use apportionment weights as a 
corrective devise in order to reduce tax distortions. The simulation results of Bettendorf 
et al. (2010) showed that an AF does not weaken incentives for tax competition. Impor-
tant to mention is that the results of these studies are highly dependent on the design of 
the formula. A drawback of the existing literature is the lack of confidential firm level 
data. However, using such data makes it possible to understand the complexity and 
relative newness of the European AF. In this research, the availability of unpublished 
data offered the opportunity to study the factors in detail. For example, we were able 
to use the sales by destination factor whereas previous research always relied on the 
sales by origin factor.
The simulation results show that including more factors and using more equal weights 
distributes the common tax base more equally. Moreover, this could reduce the incen-
tive to shift factors from high to low tax countries, which improves the efficiency of the 
new tax system. The results also indicate that simplifying the factor definitions leads to 
rather minor changes in the allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the principles of the 
apportionment formula. The development of the research questions is presented in sec-
tion 3. The data and methodology are given in section 4. Section 5 presents the results 
and discussions. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Principles of the sharing mechanism
The Commission’s working paper ‘The mechanism for sharing the CCCTB’ (EC 2006b) 
mentions three ways to share the consolidated tax base: one macro-based approach, and 
two firm-specific approaches namely, the Value Added Key (VA) and the Apportion-
ment Formula (AF). The macro-based approach implies that the common tax base of 
any CCCTB group should be allocated to the member states with reference to factors 
aggregated at the national level (GDP, VAT bases,…). The Value Added Key, designed 
for the purpose of apportioning a common tax base, should be calculated as an income-
type measure that accounts for depreciation allowances (Agundez-Garcia 2006). The 
AF could be defined as ‘a method for determining the corporate tax base of a single 
company or group of associated companies attributable to a member state (MS) by ref-
erence to a formula that assigns a proportionate share of the company’s or associated 
companies’ corporate tax base to the state by reference to a factor or factors that reflect 
(or are deemed to reflect) the underlying income-producing activities within the state’ 
(Hellerstein 2005).
The ‘ideal’ sharing approach has the intention to be simple, difficult to manipulate, 
fair and equitable (EC 2007b; Agundez-Garcia 2006). Moreover, it should not lead 
to undesirable effects in terms of tax competition. It turns out all three systems have 
advantages as well as drawbacks and therefore it is not appropriate to state that one 
method is in all respects better than the others (EC 2006b). The greatest disadvantage of 
the macro-based approach is that it may decouple an individual firm’s tax payment to a 
member country from its real economic activity in that country. With respect to the VA, 
the main drawback is that it reintroduces the need to value all intra-EU group transac-
tions (‘transfer pricing’) as a result of the strong profit-shifting incentives. The AF is 
nowadays seen as the preferred approach by the Commission because of the numerous 
disadvantages of the first two methods (Agundez-Garcia 2006).
The system of apportionment formula is well known in the US states and the Canadian 
provinces. Introduced in 1967, the ‘Massachusetts’ formula became widely used by the 
US states for some considerable time. This formula includes equally-weighted property, 
payroll and gross receipts factors. Since 1978 until now, about two thirds of the states 
have deviated from the Massachusetts formula. The most frequent deviation is to dou-
ble weight the sales factor in order to attain a balance in the apportionment of income 
between producing (assets and payroll) and marketing states (gross receipts) (Anand, 
Sansing 2000). Canada introduced a single-factor formula including a destination based 
gross receipts and added a payroll factor to the formula later on. In contrast to Europe, 
each American and Canadian state has the privilege to define its own design of the ap-
portionment formula. For that reason, we cannot compare our results with the results 
for these contexts (Hey 2008; Weiner 2005).
Based on the Massachusetts formula, the Commission suggests a multiple-factor formu-
la taking into account both the supply and demand side on the generation of companies’ 
income. The supply side is traditionally represented by the production factors labour and 
capital, whilst the demand side is represented by sales by destination. The labour factor 
will be measured both by means of payroll and number of employees.
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The Commission suggests to apportion a share of the common tax base to a company i 
of a given group as follows (EC 2007b):
 TBi = CTB
1 1 1 1
,i i i in n ni n
i i i i
i i i i
S P E A
S P E A
= = = =
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 (1)
CTB stands for the common tax base. Subscript i denotes company i from a group of 
n companies. A stands for fixed tangible assets, S is sales by destination, P represents 
employee compensation while E stands for the number of employees. α, β and γ are 
the weights of the three factors such that α + β + γ = 1. The weights of the two labour 
factors employee compensation and number of employees are represented by λ and δ 
respectively and λ + δ = 1.
2.1. Labour
The labour factor is meant to reflect the contribution of labour as a production factor in 
the generation of corporate income. According to the recommendations of the CCCTB 
WG, the labour factor should combine the payroll factor (cost of employees) and the 
number of employees factor in order to restrict the shortcomings of the two factors 
separately. With regard to the qualifying work force, it is suggested that also interim 
and temporary employment should be included. The payroll costs are considered as the 
remunerations that qualify as a deductible expense for the purpose of calculating the 
tax base, including fringe benefits, social contributions and stock options. With respect 
to the location of labour, it is put forward to look at the place where the employees 
provide their services (EC 2007b).
2.2. Assets
Although the share of intangibles, financials and currents assets can be considerably 
high, the Commission suggests that only fixed tangible assets should be included. The 
Commission argues that intangible, financial and current assets (inventory) are very 
mobile and could be used as a tax-planning tool to shift part of the factor from one 
jurisdiction to another. The year end’s tax written down value could be taken into ac-
count to calculate the asset factor. An alternative could be to take the average value 
of the tax written down value at the beginning and ending of the tax year in order to 
reflect the fluctuation of assets during the tax year. With respect to the location of fixed 
assets, it is suggested to attribute the asset to the entity which is effectively using the 
assets (EC 2007b).
2.3. Sales
The most controversial factor during the discussions in the WG was the sales factor. 
Next to the discussion whether or not to include a sales factor, a discussion is going 
on about sales by origin versus sales by destination. The former takes into account the 
place from which the goods are shipped while the latter takes into account the place in 
which the goods are shipped. The Commission suggests a sales by destination factor 
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because such a factor is less easy to manipulate and would limit the overall impact on 
tax competition in the EU due to its ‘immobility’. It is proposed that only proceeds of 
sales of goods and provision of services should be covered. With respect to the value 
of sales, the figure taken into account should be the one considered for the purpose of 
calculating the tax base. Moreover, it is suggested to attribute sales to the entity which 
is located in the member state where the final place of physical delivery is situated. The 
problem of nowhere sales arises when the group does not have a permanent establish-
ment or subsidiary in the destination state of sales or if the destination state is a non-
European country. There are several ways to deal with these nowhere sales. The first 
option is to leave these sales out of consideration. The second option includes a pure 
throw back rule, i.e. the nowhere sales are thrown back to the state of origin. Finally, 
a spread throw back rule could be applied. In this case these sales are thrown back to 
all group entities in proportion to the other formula factors. The Commission suggests 
using this spread throw back rule (EC 2007b).
3. Development of research questions
Studies in Canada and the US show that lack of uniformity can result in double taxation 
or under taxation (Weiner 2005). Moreover, a non-uniform formula does not maximize 
the social welfare of the member states (Anand, Sansing 2000). These problems would 
be even worse in Europe because of the higher differences in levels of corporate tax 
rates (Hey 2008). Therefore, unlike the US, European member states should not be al-
lowed to add or eliminate factors, to change definitions or to apply different weights 
(EC 2007b). In spite of the conviction to use a uniform formula, a discussion is going 
on about the actual number of allocation factors to be included, the weights applied to 
them and their definitions. 
3.1. Varying the number of factors
The number of factors included will influence the tax planning opportunities for the 
group. If the formula includes only one factor there can be a strong incentive to relocate 
this factor to a low tax country in order to decrease the overall EU-tax rate. Important 
to mention is that the immobility of the factors could hamper the possibility to relocate 
these factors. This is one of the reasons the Commission proposes a multiple factor 
formula including the rather immobile combined labour factor (number of employees 
and costs of employees), the sales by destination factor and the fixed tangible assets 
factor, instead of rather mobile factors such as inventory and intangible assets. By using 
a multiple factor formula the reallocation incentive is reduced, i.e. the relocation of one 
unit of these factors would shift less than one unit of the tax base (EC 2007b). Bearing 
in mind the above literature, we want to illustrate the formula’s sensitivity to the number 
of factors included. More specifically, we investigate the following questions: 
To what extent do the allocation effects differ when assuming equal weights and varying 
the number of factors? 
What is the effect on the group’s incentive to relocate one or more apportionment fac-
tors?
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2013, 14(2): 235–251
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3.2. Varying the factor weights
Besides the number of factors included, the weights applied to the factors will also in-
fluence tax planning opportunities. Using a formula with more than one factor requires 
all factors to be weighted by a fraction so that the sum of these weights equals one. 
Ignoring this condition can lead to under-taxation or double taxation (EC 2007a).
We can distinguish different methods of assigning factor weights. First, a straightfor-
ward way is to weight each factor equally. The Massachusetts formula, including the 
equally weighted factors property, payroll and gross receipts, became widely used by the 
US. Since its introduction, about two thirds of the states have deviated from the Mas-
sachusetts formula. Nowadays, the most frequent deviation is to double weight the sales 
factor in order to attain a balance in the apportionment of income between producing 
(assets and payroll) and marketing states (gross receipts) (Anand, Sansing 2000). This 
second way of assigning factor weights can also be illustrated by the Canadian prov-
inces using a two-factor payroll and gross revenue formula that is equally weighted. In 
the light of the European proposal, a balance between supply and demand side could be 
realised by weighting payroll and assets by one quarter each and sales by one half. On 
the contrary, if the supply or demand approach would be favoured, greater weight could 
be put on the supply and demand factors respectively (Weiner 2005; Agundez-Garcia 
2006). Finally, specific factor weights may be estimated using econometric analysis. In 
particular, factors may be weighted according to the specific contribution each factor 
makes to the overall profits (Agundez-Garcia 2006; Weiner 2005). Keeping in mind the 
above literature, we want to illustrate the formula’s sensitivity to the weights applied to 
the factors. More specifically, we examine the following questions: 
To what extent do the allocation effects differ when assuming three factors and varying 
the weights applied to these factors? 
What is the effect on the group’s incentive to relocate one or more apportionment fac-
tors?
3.3. Varying the factor definitions
Another important issue is the applicability of the formula. The Commission suggests 
to apply several tax corrections to the book values of fixed tangible assets and labour. 
Moreover, the Commission wants to use a spread throw back rule in case of nowhere 
sales. Instead of using the Commission’s definitions, one could opt for more easily 
defined factors. If using more easily defined factors results in minor changes to the al-
location of the common tax base, the higher compliance costs the proposed definitions 
bring along are more difficult to justify. On the contrary, the higher compliance cost 
could possibly be justified if using more easily defined factors results to major changes 
in the allocation. In this research we leave the size of the compliance costs out of con-
sideration and focus on the possible changes in allocation effects when using different 
factor definitions. We investigate the following question:
To what extent do the allocation effects differ when using simplified factor definitions 
instead of the more complex factor definitions as proposed by the Commission?
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4. Data collection and methodology
4.1. Data collection
To assess the effects of several designs for the AF, we use data of 2007 from a listed 
multinational active in the clothing manufacturing sector. All core activities of the mul-
tinational are conducted at the headquarters in Belgium. The structure of the company 
during the financial year 2007 can be given upon request. We name each entity after 
the country where it is located. To form the CCCTB group we consider the criteria as 
proposed by the technical outlines. The qualifying subsidiaries are mentioned in Table 1. 
The Hungarian subsidiary is a production entity whereas France2 and Germany3 are 
retailers. The other subsidiaries are agencies responsible for the local sellers and work 
on commission. The Belgian parent company continues to be responsible for billing 
customers in these countries.
Table 1 presents the collected entity data necessary to apply the AF for the group.
• The factor assets (A) represents the average tax written down value of the fixed 
tangible assets at the beginning (31/12/2006) and at the end (31/12/2007) of the 
fiscal year 2007.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the CCCTB entities
 Assets (A) Employees ( E) Payroll (P) Sales (S) Taxable profit
Belgium 12,162,944 431 15,505,091 44,682,307 36,951,548
Italy 327 1 165,521 1,783,780 87,685
Great-Britain 0 3 242,297 8,008,093 10,117
Netherlands 59,513 6 375,243 16,892,369 616,511
Luxembourg 0 0 0 718,302 108,891
Hungary 1,856,927 368 2,620,295 3,726,075 990,480
Finland 3,225 2 95,040 2,831,084 139,277
France1 3,476 15 946,976 5,288,804 –27,296
Germany1 0 0 0 0 3,422
Germany2 9,194 15 1,111,216 7,764,997 –203,052
Spain 690 3 161,869 4,241,011 0
Denmark 0 1 32,635 6,644,563 –96,571
France2 420,634 12 254,873 10,093,698 358,606
Germany3 600,893 15 515,229 17,653,032 –496,551
TOTAL 15,117,822 873 22,026,284 130,328,117 38,443,066
minimum 0 0 0 0 –496,551
maximum 12,162,944 431 15,505,091 44,682,307 36,951,548
mean 1,079,844 62 1,573,306 9,309,151 2,745,933
median 3,350 5 248,585 5,966,684 48,901
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2013, 14(2): 235–251
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• The combined labour factor consists of both payroll and number of employees. 
Payroll (P) includes the fiscally accepted costs of workers, employees and direc-
tors for the year 2007. This is increased by the fiscally accepted costs of temporary 
workers and students. The number of employees (E) is calculated as the average 
number of workers, employees and directors for the fiscal year 2007. The average 
number of temporary workers and students is added.
• The factor sales (S) consists of sales attributed to each particular entity in 2007, i.e. 
sales by destination. In case of nowhere sales, the sales are thrown back according 
to the spread throw back rule.
• Taxable profit represents the individual profit as mentioned in the corporate tax 
declaration. Taxable group profit (total) equals the sum of taxable profits (according 
to national rules) of all entities. The group profit takes into account loss compensa-
tion but does not eliminate possible intra-group profit.
4.2. Methodology
Using the simulation technique, we will evaluate the effects of the number of factors 
included into the formula as well as the effects of the weights applied to these factors. 
In order to do this, we form two sets of formulas represented in Table 2. The first set 
represents ‘the factor formulas’ that include one, two or three factors when assuming 
equal weights. We name F3 the classic three factor formula. This is the formula pro-
posed by the Commission. The second set contains ‘the weight formulas’ applying equal 
or less equal weights when assuming a three factor formula. Formula Wa uses equal 
weights, codes starting with Wb adopt weights of ½, ¼ and ¼ whereas codes with Wc 
apply even more unequal weights, namely 2/3, 1/6 and 1/6. We choose weights that are 
in line with realistic weights of AF in the US. (Weiner 2005). Also, the Commission is 
interested in simulations using these weights (EC 2007c). 
For each entity the different formulas result in an entity share (ES) and in an entity 
percentage payable (EPP). An ES is the share an entity gets of the common tax base 
when a specific formula is applied. The EPP on the common tax base is the product of 
its ES and the corporate tax rate (CTR) applied in its country: 
 EPPi = ESi*CTRi . (2)
Adding these EPPi results in the global corporate tax rate for the group (GCTR):
 
1







where subscript i denotes entity i from a group of n entities.
Finally, we look at the allocation effects of using simplified factor definitions instead 
of the more complex factor definitions as proposed by the Commission. To study these 
allocation effects we first look at the impact of simplifying one factor while keeping 
the others constant. Afterwards, we consider the allocation impact of including all three 
simplified factors. We simplify assets by using the book value of fixed tangible assets 
on the 31th of December 2007 instead of the average of the tax written down value at 
the beginning (31th December 2006) and ending of the tax year (31th December 2007). 
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We simplify the combined labour factor by defining the work force as the average 
number of workers, employees and directors in 2007 and their payroll costs as the costs 
mentioned in the profit and loss accounts 2007. According to the European proposal the 
work force should also include temporary workers and students and payroll cost should 
be the fiscally accepted costs. With respect to the sales by destination factor we take 
into account a pure throw back rule instead of the proposed spread throw back rule. A 
pure throw back rule implies that all sales that are going to a European country where 
the group lacks a taxing nexus or to a non-European country (i.e. ‘nowhere’ sales), are 
thrown back to the state of origin. By contrast, a spread throw back rule assigns these 
sales to all group entities in proportion to the other formula factors.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Varying the number of factors
Table 3 contains the ES each entity gets from the common tax base when simulating the 
different factor formulas (Panel A). The table also contains the EPP on the common tax 
base as well as the GCTR of the group when simulating these factor formulas (Panel B).
From Panel B we can see that the group has the lowest GCTR when applying the 
formula only including the combined labour factor (F1b). Under these circumstances, 
the GCTR equals 30.09%. This favourable result can be explained by the fact that the 
Table 2. Factor and weight formulas
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combined labour factor is abundantly present in Hungary, the country with the lowest 
tax rate of the group. When we have a look at Panel A, formula F1b apportions 27.03% 
of the common tax base to Hungary, which is the highest ES of all ES going to Hungary.
Panel A also illustrates that the more factors included into the formula, the more chance 
the Belgian group would get an equally distributed common tax base. For the one-factor 
formulas (F1), the minimum and maximum share an entity can get from the common tax 
base is 0% and 80.45% respectively. The two-factor formulas (F2) apportion a minimum 
of 0% and a maximum of 70.18% to an entity, while the three-factor formula finds a 
minimum of 0% and a maximum of 58.22%. We can see that the spread between the 
minimum and the maximum shares an entity can get becomes smaller as more factors 
are included. 
The distribution of the common tax base is also visualised in Figure 1. This figure rep-
resents a graph which uses the concept of a Lorenz curve applied to the distribution of 
the common tax base among entities. All entities are arranged from smallest to largest 
concerning their ES of the common tax base. Afterwards, these shares are cumulated. 
The results show that the more factors included into the formula, the more the distribu-
tion of the common tax base approaches an equal distribution.
A more equally distributed common tax base, as a result of including more factors into 
the formula, could reduce the incentive to shift one or more allocation factor(s). The 
relocation of one unit of these factors would shift less than one unit of the common tax 
base. In order to illustrate this, we assume the extreme case where the Belgian group 
would shift all Belgian fixed tangible assets to its entity located in the low tax country 
Hungary. Table 4 represents the distribution of the common tax base before and after 
shifting. Our starting point are the figures of the tax year 2007 from Table 1. This table 
shows that the Belgian entity has an amount of €12,162,944 fixed tangible assets which 
equals 80.45% of the total amount. For the one factor formula including assets (F1c), 
the relocation of this 80.45% from the Belgian entity to the Hungarian entity effectively 
shifts 80.45% (92.74–12.28%) of the common tax base to the Hungarian entity. Look-
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ing at the two factor formulas including assets (F2b and F2c), the relocation of 80.45% 
of total assets only shifts 46.08% (53.11–7.03%) and 40.23% (59.89–19.66%) of the 
common tax base to the Hungarian entity. For the three factor formula the distribution 
effect is the smallest, namely the relocation only shifts 28.77% (42.83–14.06%) of the 
common tax base to the Hungarian entity. When shifting labour or sales from a high 
tax country to a low tax country, similar results could be found. In brief, our example 
illustrates that the incentive to shift an allocation factor could be reduced by including 
more factors into the formula.
Table 4. ES of the common tax base before and after shifting  
(factor formulas including assets)
ES before shifting (tax year 2007) in % ES after shifting in %
 F1c F2b F2c F3 F1c F2b F2c F3
BE 80.45 58.12 70.18 58.22 0.00 12.04 29.95 29.45
IT 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.60
GB 0.00 3.05 0.36 2.29 0.00 3.05 0.36 2.29
NE 0.39 6.65 0.79 4.85 0.39 6.65 0.79 4.85
LU 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18
HU 12.28 7.03 19.66 14.06 92.74 53.11 59.89 42.83
FI 0.02 1.09 0.18 0.84 0.02 1.09 0.18 0.84
FR1 0.02 0.06 1.52 2.36 0.02 0.06 1.52 2.36
GER1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GER2 0.06 0.18 1.72 3.13 0.06 0.18 1.72 3.13
SP 0.00 1.61 0.28 1.27 0.00 1.61 0.28 1.27
DE 0.00 2.54 0.07 1.74 0.00 2.54 0.07 1.74
FR2 2.78 7.19 2.02 3.93 2.78 7.19 2.02 3.93
GER3 3.97 11.54 3.00 6.52 3.97 11.54 3.00 6.52
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
5.2. Varying the factor weights
Table 5 contains the ES (Panel A) and the EPP (Panel B) when simulating the weight 
formulas. From Panel B we can see that the group has the lowest GCTR when applying 
the formula putting the largest weight (2/3) on the combined labour factor (Wc1). Un-
der these circumstances the GCTR equals 30.53%. This favourable result can again be 
explained by the fact that the combined labour factor is abundantly present in Hungary. 
When we have a look at Panel A, formula Wc1 apportions 20.55% of the common tax 
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Panel A also illustrates that the more equal the weights are, the more chance the Belgian 
group would get an equally distributed common tax base. When applying the most un-
equal weights (Wc0, Wc1, Wc2), the minimum apportionment share an entity can get 
is 0% and the maximum share 69.33%. Less unequal weights (Wb0, Wb1, Wb2) result 
in a minimum share of 0% and a maximum share of 63.78%. The equally weighted 
three factor formula (Wa) leads to a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 58.22%. We 
can see that the spread between the minimum and maximum shares an entity can get 
becomes smaller when applying more equal weights. This can also be visualized by 
Lorenz curves which can be given upon request.
A more equally distributed common tax base, as a result of applying more equal weights 
to the factors, could reduce the incentive to shift one or more allocation factor(s). In 
order to illustrate this, we follow the same procedure as explained under ‘varying the 
number of factors’. The results can be given upon request.
5.3. Varying the factor definitions
Table 6 gives the ES and the GCTR when using more easily defined factor definitions. 
These results concern simplifications of the classic three factor formula. We first look at 
the impact of simplifying one factor while keeping the others constant. Table 6 shows 
that simplifying the factor definition of assets (ii) results in a maximum entity change 
in the allocation of the common tax base of only 2.93% (FR2). Using a more easy com-
bined labour factor (iii) leads to a maximum change of only 1.14% (HU). Applying the 
pure throw back rule in order to simplify the sales by destination factor (iv) results in 
a maximum change of 37.20% (GER3). On the group level, simplifying assets leads to 
rather minor changes into the GCTR (relative change of 0.03%). The same conclusion 
can be made when simplifying the combined labour factor (relative change of 0.07%). 
Applying the pure throw back rule results in a somewhat higher change into the GCTR 
(relative change of 0.44%). Secondly, we look at the allocation effects when includ-
ing all three simplified factors (v). In this case, the entity change is limited to 38.55% 
(GER3) and the relative change in the GCTR equals 0.4%. 
We cannot generalize these results because of the particularity of each case. However, 
these results indicate that it would be interesting to study the average effect on a large 
scale sample. If using simplified factor definitions on average leads to rather minor chang-
es in the allocation of the common tax base, it could be appropriate to investigate whether 
or not the higher compliance costs the proposed definitions bring along are justified.
Finally, we would like to mention that especially applying the spread throw back rule 
is a complex matter. However, using a less complex pure throw back rule instead of the 
spread throw back rule transforms the sales by destination factor into a more origin-
based factor and as a consequence disturbs the balance between the supply and demand 
side of profit generating factors. This also re-introduces tax planning opportunities to 
manipulate the starting points of exports. Keeping this in mind, it is desirable to apply 
a spread throw back rule to nowhere sales. In order to solve the remaining problem of 
complexity, it could be helpful to reach multinational groups a computer-based tool that 
enables them to apply the spread throw back rule without great efforts. 
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Table 6. ES of the common tax base and the global corporate tax rates  
(GCTR) using simplified factors
Factor definitions formula F3
(i) non simplified assets, combined labour and sales by destination 
(ii) simplified assets 
(iii) simplified combined labour 
(iv) simplified sales by destination 
(v) simplified assets, combined labour and sales by destination
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
BE ES (%) 58.22 58.45 58.01 59.66 59.68
% change 0.40 –0.36 2.48 2.52
IT ES (%) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59
% change –0.01 0.20 –1.75 –1.58
GB ES (%) 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.27 2.27
% change 0.00 0.10 –0.76 –0.67
NE ES (%) 4.85 4.90 4.85 4.81 4.86
% change 0.99 0.09 –0.79 0.21
LU ES (%) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
% change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HU ES (%) 14.06 14.00 14.22 13.11 13.20
% change –0.40 1.14 –6.78 –6.09
FI ES (%) 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83
% change –0.12 0.15 –1.01 –0.98
FR1 ES (%) 2.36 2.36 2.37 2.89 2.90
% change –0.05 0.45 22.37 22.75
GER1 ES (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.09 2.09
% change (ii–i)/0 (iii–i)/0 (iv–i)/0 (v–i)/0
GER2 ES (%) 3.13 3.13 3.14 3.24 3.25
% change –0.12 0.36 3.34 3.61
SP ES (%) 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.26
% change 0.00 0.17 –1.07 –0.92
DE ES 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74
% change 0.00 0.03 –0.18 –0.15
FR2 ES (%) 3.93 3.82 3.94 3.23 3.13
% change –2.93 0.15 –17.81 –20.40
GER3 ES (%) 6.52 6.42 6.52 4.09 4.00
% change –1.55 0.13 –37.20 –38.55
GCTR (%)  30.97 30.97 30.94 31.10 31.09
% change 0.03 –0.07 0.44 0.40
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6. Conclusion
The European Commission (EC) has the intention to establish a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in order to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, simplic-
ity and transparency of the European company tax system. This study uses firm level 
data from a listed multinational in order to assess how several designs of the CCCTB 
formula could affect the allocation of the consolidated tax base. We investigate to what 
extent the allocation effects differ when including one or more factor(s) into the formula 
or putting high or low weights on the formula factors. Moreover, we study how the 
design of the apportionment formula is related to the intention to shift formula factors. 
Further, we examine the allocation effects of using simplified factor definitions instead 
of the more complex factor definitions as proposed by the Commission.
The simulation results show that the design of the apportionment formula is impor-
tant in affecting the distribution of the common tax base. Specifically, including more 
factors and using more equal weights distributes the common tax base more equally, 
which could reduce the group’s incentive to shift factors from high to low tax countries. 
These results suggest that in order to create an efficient formula, i.e. a formula not caus-
ing any behavioural distortions, more factors should be included. Also, applying more 
equal weights to the factors could contribute to this aim. The results also indicate that 
simplifying the factor definitions as proposed by the Commission, leads to rather minor 
changes in the allocation of the common tax base. However, we are not big proponents 
of simplifying the sales by destination factor. Simplifying this sales factor, by applying 
the pure throw back rule instead of the spread throw back rule, transforms the factor 
into a more origin based factor. Therefore, we suggest the Commission to reach mul-
tinational groups a computer-based tool enabling them to apply the spread throw back 
rule without great efforts.
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